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Abstract
Sweden has undergone major changes in its mediasphere during the last
twelve years, during which two oppositional forces have been particularly at
work, capitalist and socialist. Both these forces have influenced the direction
in which the national mediasphere is transforming. The challenges of these
political discourses, and responses from the parties involved regarding the
role of the media in society, has been increasingly visible since the late
1950s, when the public service monopoly was first called into question.

The Swedish socialist government has promoted and protected its non commercial public service monopoly, through which they could mould national
identity and distribute culture and enlightenment to all Swedish citizens. The
public service broadcaster, although 'independent', has been closely tied to
and monitored by the state, which has put society, education, seriousness,
discussion on social and political issues and non - commercialism at the top of
its public broadcasting agenda.

With the threat to the public service monopoly and to the security of control,
there has been considerable cultural, economical, political and social debate
in and between various national organisations. The discourses surrounding
these issues have been especially prominent during the last decade, at a time
when the nature of the Swedish mediasphere has changed radically. As
transnational commercial broadcasters began finding their way into the
Swedish market, the socialist government faced, on one hand, pressure to

iv

respond to increasing market forces. On the other hand, pressure also arose
regarding the protection and strengthening of the public service broadcaster
(Weibull & Severinsson, in Negrine, 1988, p. 85).

Through the public broadcaster, the transnational commercial broadcasters,
and the political discourses regarding them both, I will create a picture of the
Swedish mediasphere and analyse the cultural, political, social and economic
policy - making by the governing parties. I will also analyse the 'desired'
outcomes of the oppositional forces in question.

In this dissertation, I will argue that what started out as cultural concerns
relating to increasing capitalist imperialism within the field of broadcasting,
has led to the consideration of other issues as well, regarding the discussion
of political and economical sovereignty. Also involved is the 'perceived'
necessity of technological innovation, mainly in response to the necessity to
protect the 'threatened' Swedish cultural beliefs, values and traditions. These
discourses have arisen mostly in response to the intensification of globalising
forces, where people, goods and services flow more freely and are tied
increasingly closer together.

During cultural debates on protection from the 'negative' influences reaching
Sweden as a result of transnational corporations, technological development
has become an even more important part of Swedish policy- making. As will
be argued, two main beliefs regarding technology have arisen. Firstly, a
governing belief in technology as 'neutral' can be observed, and secondly, a
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promise of technological 'salvation' seems to have developed among the
governing parties, and especially in the socialist one.

The material used in this dissertation has been researched both in Sweden
and in Australia, and wherever a passage from a non - English text has been
translated and quoted, the original quote in Swedish has been provided for
the reader as a reference.
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Chapter 1
Background to the Subject and Introduction
to the Ideological Frameworks.
Sweden introduced, as the last nation in Western Europe, commercial television
in 1992 by establishing a third terrestrial channel, TV 4. Sweden has, from the
Second World War till today, primarily been a socialist nation, and the Social
Democratic Party has only lost three elections (1976, 1979 and 1991 ), resulting
at these times in a right block majority in the Swedish Riksdag1. Social Democrat
Olof Palme, Minister of Communication, during the 1960s and 1970s and later
Prime Minister, was deeply involved in the development of the Swedish television
industry, which according to him should "safeguard uncompromisingly and with a
steadfastness bordering on passion, the right of television to make open criticism
of society, of the authortties, and of private interests" (Ortman< 1979, p. 144). He
went on to say that '1he best possible guarantees against abuse and for freedom
of expression are to be secured through a corporation operating in the service of
the public, that is, a corporation that is not owned by private interests nor
financed by advertising" (Ortman< 1979, p. 144). Since the start of radio, and later
television broadcasting in Sweden, the socialist government has always had a
very negative attitude towards unregulated media and in particular media
financed by advertising.

During the last ten years the Swedish policy makers have been increasingly
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challenged by transnational influences, forcing them to take action and re evaluate their broadcasting values and political stance. Great debate, resistance
and the embracing of technology have been the result. This thesis seeks to
analyse the conflicting ideologies at work, the transformation of the Swedish
mediasphere (which primarily has occurred during the 1990s), and the increasing
strength of transnational influences.

The values of 'democracy' and 'freedom of speech' have for a long time been
part of the Swedish Constitution, as well as held in high importance and spoken
of as part of the national identity and culture. Television and radio were seen as
useful tools to reach the people and the socialist government laid great emphasis
on the goals of raising the values of 'taste' and knowledge among citizens
through these media and promoting a unified 'high' culture as represented by the
cultural priorities of the elite. From the start of radio transmissions in Sweden, the
media has been closely tied to the State and particularly the government (Hulten
1995, p. 46). Even though the media is regulated and under control, it has been
'independent' from the State, and prohibition of censorship by the government
applies.

These new broadcasting media, radio and television, gave rise to certain
concerns. "It was feared [by the socialist government that the mass media] would
divert people from reading books, going to meetings, or being active in voluntary
associations or labour unions" (Hulten 1 995, p. 47). The established elite in
Sweden saw the function of these media to be educational, serious, to serve
2

people with 'unbiased' information, to engage people in social and political
discourse, and to raise the 'common knowledge' and taste among the citizens,
referred to as folkbildning2.

Frow and Morris (1996, p. 345) point out that "the concept of culture [could refer]
to the existence of social groups - their formation, their maintenance, their
definition against other groups [and] the constant process of their re - formation".
Culture operates on different levels, Frow and Morris (1996) continue: the nation
- state and/or the level of national culture, class, gender, race, age, sexuality and
ethnicity.

Sweden is a socialist State, and some argue that it should be run according to
the principles of 'State - Led - Society', in opposition to capitalist nations, which
have adopted the principles of a 'Market - Led - Society' (TristaZeen, n.d, p. 3).
Rokeach (in Rosengren 1994, p. 15) offers a short definition of the systems
involved here; Socialism puts high value on freedom and equality, while Liberal

Capitalism puts high value on freedom and less on equality.

Stuart Hall (in During 1993, p. 13) argues that the new right believes "the state
should intervene in citizens' lives to the minimum possible extent so that market
forces can structure as many social relations and exchanges as possible"... and
that "the affirmation of internal differences (especially between classes, ethnic
groups and genders) could threaten national unity". Michel Foucault (in During
1993, p. 19) continues the argument that "culture is neither an end in itself nor a
3

product of autonomous agents- individual or communtties-but a mechanism for
transmitting forms of 'governmentality', for ordering how we act, think, live."

Radio was considered to be part of national political and cultural society, and
therefore, tt was also to uphold the strong values of democracy and folkbildning.
The socialist values and ideals underpinning Swedish broadcasting can be
observed in the 1960 Governmental Inquiry presented in 196 5, (Sou 196 5, p. 20)
into the media, and the role broadcasting ought to play as part of nation building. The inquiry, analysed by Thuren (1997, p. 132 - 133), describes two
possible formulae for the media. The first one suggests that the media should
function according to the principles of any capitalist corporation, in competition
with others, financed by commercials, like the system in the United States. This
proposal was rejected, the main argument being that in such a system it is
impossible, owing to technological reasons, to guarantee pluralism. There are not
enough frequencies to secure a multitude of channels, and (according to the
inquiry), a commercial based system tends to limtt the range of different
programs and become dominated by light entertainment, where the need to
attract advertisers prevents the television stations from discussing more
controversial issues. Swedish regulators believed it imperative that the media
were free from "other irrelevant imagined interests, where one primarily refers to
the aspiration of economic profit"3 (Thuren 1997, p. 132).

Anti - commercial broadcasting attttudes have traditionally been strong not only
in Sweden, but in the other Nordic nations as well. Commercialism has been
4

viewed with scepticism and considered by the socialist establishment as in vulgar
taste. Supporters of the national public service broadcasting monopoly argued
that the services of commercial television systems would always have to give
priority to others than from the people (Hulten 1995, p. 49). To the socialist
government the media were to be a contributing part of Swedish culture and a
distributor of knowledge. They were not to be influenced by sellers of
commodities. In fact, "one of the fundamental ideas in support of the national
state monopoly in radio, and later television, has been the universal distribution
of information, culture, and enlightenment to all sectors and comers of the
country" (Hulten 1995 , p. 42). Thus it is no surprise that the 1960 Governmental
Inquiry recommended the non - commercial alternative, drawing on socialist

ideology.

It was proposed that the function of media should be the service of the
community, and that the community in return should participate in the
organisation and contribute to the financial needs of the national broadcaster
(Thuren 1997, p. 133). The audiovisual media were therefore to rely on f inancial
funds distributed by the government. The media are 'independent', but with
government financial control, thus 'independence' becomes problematic. This will
be discussed further in chapter 2. Every Swedish household with a television set
(about three million) has to pay a licence fee; which currently is approximately A$
12 per month, contributing to the public service broadcaster's finances.

5

The public service broadcaster, Sveriges Television (SVT 1 and 2), is also,
(indirectly), owned by the people. Twenty per cent of the shares are held by the
Swedish press, 20 per cent by private trade and business organisations and 60
per cent by popular movements (folkrorelsef'), which include labour unions,
consumer groups, farmers' associations, adult education bodies and churches
(Noam 1991, p. 205). Unions in Sweden are a very strong component of society;
85 per cent of the working citizens were, in 1994, members of a union (Statistiska
4
Centralbyran 1996), organised in the Confederation of Trade Unions - (L0) .

This is compared to the United Kingdom's approximately 33 per cent
(Encyclopcedia Britannica n.d. A) and the low 14 per cent in the United States
(AFL - CIO 1998). Further, the Board of Governors of Sveriges Radio, (SR,
which included both radio and television until 1993), has incorporated within it the
major influential and power groups in Swedish society; representatives of the
major parties, corporations and organisations (Ortmark 1979, 147). The Board of
Governors has thirteen representatives of which six are appointed by the
government, five by the shareholders and two by the trade unions (Howell 1986,
p. 11O). The Social Democratic Party, which has dominated the Riksdag for four
decades, has therefore been able indirectly to influence the labour unions'
representatives in SR (Noam 1991, p. 205). Similar to the left block, the right
block also has close connections with groups, organisations and popular
movements in Swedish society. To understand the nature of political life in
Sweden, one has to know that both Labor and Conservative are to the left of the
American left wing, according to TristaZeen (n.d, p. 1). There have, since the
start of broadcasting media, been struggles between the left and the right block,
6

with most of the triggers for deregulation of the media constituted by influences
from outside the Swedish borders, which will be discussed later in chapter 2.

The 1960 Governmental Inquiry put forward two main responsibilities for the
Swedish public service broadcaster, and a third (lesser) responsibility. It should
serve in the 'interest of the community' and meet the 'desires of the viewers', and
enhance "spiritual cultivation . . . fine culture and art . . . and human values"
(Thuren 1997, p. 135). By the 'interest of the community' the inquiry explains (in
Thuren 1997, p. 133) that public service broadcasting should:
in many different ways keep citizens well informed. The goal
here is comprehensive information about their own country as
well as the world at large, which reaches all adult citizens, the
ones who are responsible for the maintenance of society. An
essential part of this information constitutes the reporting of
different opinions, values, and points of view, which is an
integrated part of modern democracy. We believe that for a
democracy to work well, it requires knowledgeable citizens,
who take part in the social opinion - making processes and
therefore can farticipate in the state processes in a
meaningful way.
The media should treat its audience as citizens involved in debates of national,
political, and cultural issues in a democratic society and not as subjects or
customers. It was the opinion of the inquiry that modem community, owing to its
complextty, requires the co - operation of the media, especially radio and
television, to provide important information to citizens (Thuren 1997, p. 134).

With the second responsibiltty, the 'desires of viewers', the inquiry proposed that
as many desires as possible should be satisfied, without giving any concessions
7

to commercialism. Thuren (1997, p. 134) refers to this as 'the lowest common
denominator', and the following argument is provided by the inquiry:

A closer look shows ... that the "greater'' audience consists of
a multttude of larger and smaller groups; that every individual
can be a part of several of these, and that the membership of
different groups and interests crosses boundaries and varies
in many ways. One must also keep in mind that different
interests can be more or less central to the individual, that
what gathers a large audience often is a kind of "lowest
common denominator'' which is also, therefore, pretty
peripheral to most people included in this audience. It is often
those interests that the individual shares wtth a few people
only that mean the most. Therefore it is as important to satisfy
the desires of the smaller audiences, as it is of the larger
ones. 6
The media is required to respect and observe all the interests of various groups,
minority and majority, that constitute the society as a whole, and this would not
be possible in a commercialised system according to the inquiry (Thuren 1997, p.
134).

The broadcasting media were, as a third responsibiltty, to uphold and promote
abstract values which lead to the "spiritual cultivation, to the development of fine
culture and art, to style and manner in society, in essence towards all the human
values that can be influenced by media activities"7 (Thuren 1997, p. 135). This
statement indicates that 'spiritual cultivation' and the 'development of fine culture
and art' are regarded as having their own worth, separate from the desire of the
individual being, and it strongly reflects an encouraging paternalistic attitude,
much like folkbildning. This third principle of broadcasting served the government
as self - improvement and the fostering of knowledge and understanding among
8

the general populace. Government and media control are paternalistic in style,
providing for the needs of the people in general (Hulten 1995, p. 42 - 43), and
eliminating distractions and irrelevancies. Through the media, citizens were
expected to acquire important information and knowledge, and engage in
political, social and cultural debate. As a result of this activity, the level of 'taste'
and 'value' (as represented by the elite culture) would grow stronger and improve
society as a whole.

The Riksdag set up rules and guidelines, The Radio Act, between the state and
the national public service broadcaster (and later also TV 4) for the media to
observe and follow during broadcasting and the production of programs. The
State has, however, on principle, always kept itself at a distance from production
(Edin 1996, p. 200). The appropriate level of political influence has always been
heavily debated, but it has each time been made clear that politicians may not
involve themselves in the production process, nor can they, as stated in Section
8 of The Radio Act, view a program in advance, use censorship or prohibit It due
to Its content. There is however a special council, Granskningsnamnden8, that
may after a broadcast examine a program for any possible breaches of The

Radio Act (Hadenius 1992, p. 118). The role of the government within public
service broadcasting, (and It will be argued in this dissertation that this is
problematic), should be a balanced one, but the public service broadcaster has
often criticised political representatives, claiming that they cross the line too often
and interfere to much in program production (Edin 1996, p. 200).

9

There have also been other forces at work, which have different goals, values
and opinions on their agenda. Since the start of radio, there has been a constant
struggle between socialist and capitalist broadcasting values of regulation and
deregulation, wtthin Sweden and SVT itself. The majority of the pressure,
however, for deregulation and commercialisation has come from beyond the
Nordic nations. The early instances of this, involving illegal radio transmissions,
took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Radio Nord began
broadcasting over Sweden. This contributed significantly to the initiation of the

1960 Governmental Inquiry. With the increasing struggle of commercial
broadcasting for a foothold in Swedish society it is possible to observe and
analyse the political policies regarding national and transnational broadcasting,
regulation or deregulation of these, and the forces that propel the processes of
globalisation.

In 1958 a radio station, FM Radio Mercur, began broadcasting over Denmark
and in 1961 Radio Nord made its appearance on the Swedish airwaves. The ship
transmitting Radio Nord positioned itself in international waters in the Baltic Sea,
off Stockholm's archipelago. By 1963 various ships had positioned themselves
around Europe. The ship transmitting Radio Nord, called Bonjour, was American
owned, registered in Liechtenstein and manned with a Swedish crew (Skornia
1965, p. 183 - 184). Various American companies, such as Ford, Lever Brothers
and the American Tobacco Company sponsored these ships broadcasting
commercial radio (Skornia 1965, p. 183 - 184). This sponsorship would have had
a role in persuading the nations, which received the transmissions to deregulate
10

their media sectors. This may not have been the motive, however, the companies
could just have advertised at any price, concerned mainly with increasing profits.

Regardless of this, the Swedish government considered pirate radio a threat to
its political ideology and forbade the advertising (Hulten 1995, p. 48), but the
radio station continued to broadcast. Fears were also raised that this intrusive
commercial channel would destroy the 'unique' Swedish culture, and the long term aim of folkbildning in a socialist spirit.

By 1959, one year after Radio Mercur began broadcasting, it had a turnover of
US$ 150, 000 from advertising revenues. In 1962 the Swedish Board of
Telecommunications approved, after heavy parliamentary debate, legislation that
would "prevent the commercial radio transmissions to Sweden from outside
terrestrial waters" (Skornia 1965, p. 185) and further emphasis was laid upon The

1960 Governmental Inquiry, initiated two years earlier in 1960, whose objectives
included analysis of the Swedish mediasphere, and its future development. In
June of 1962 Radio Nord ceased its broadcasting.

The general public, however, had enjoyed the variety Radio Nord brought and
pressure was put on the government. In order to meet the new public demands,
and in response to the fears of further transnational commercial stations, the
government introduced (in 1962) a popular music channel and (in 1964) one with
light music, both non - commercial (Noam 1991 , p. 204).

Public service broadcasting in Sweden has always been closely linked to the
State, and considered an integral part of the debates and priorities of traditional
11

socialist political and cultural issues and concepts. When the commission
presented its proposals in 196 5, it suggested that a second television channel
should be established. A lively debate broke out regarding the different financial
suggestions for funding SVT 2.
Supporters of commercial television argued against the public service
broadcasting monopoly and accused the broadcaster of failing to encourage
diversity. They suggested that a commercial channel would bring in more
revenue and therefore be able to broadcast better, and more diverse, programs
(Hadenius 1992, p. 12 3). The attit udes inform ing The 1960 Governmental Inquiry
remained strong, however, and as a result SVT 2 was introduced in 196 9 as a
non - commercial channel. Another factor influencing the decision was the
Swedish press, which was against any commercialisation of television, mainly
owing to its concerns regarding the press losing advertising revenues as a
consequence.
The socialist government considered it very important that, between them, SVT 1
and 2 were to eliminate structural differences in opportunities for people, and
give everybody the same chance of enriching experiences. Within the area of
folkbildning and education, the two television channels and the three radio

channels, would introduce people to new areas of knowledge and provide easier
access to information regarding relevant social issues. The government was
enthusiastic about the possibility of widening the access of 'high' culture to
people who could not afford to visit theatre, opera and concerts (Thuren 1997, p.
136 - 137). The two channels would operate in a " stimulating race for the best
producers, writers, journalists, and programmes, . . . rather than a chase f or the
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biggest audiences, which would follow from commercial competition" (Hulten
1995, p. 51).

The Swedish socialist government had experienced Radio Nord and the ease
with which it beamed into the nation as very disturbing, and as a major threat to
their ideological values and beliefs. During the 1960s the socialist government
became increasingly aware of developments in satellite and cable technology,
and their possible threat to the public service broadcasting monopoly (Hulten
1995, p. 53). In response to these new telecommunication technologies being
developed, the socialist government embarked on its own satellite and cable
developments, primarily to protect ttself from (in their opinion) destructive forces
which threatened Swedish culture and the political agenda. The technological
advances made in the capitalist nations were studied, after which an equivalent
of the new technology was developed and integrated to serve alongside the
Swedish socialist agenda.

Dyson and Humphreys (1988, p. 48) argue that Sweden and the other Nordic
nations (Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland), although they vary in specific
policies, share a very strong and developed tradition of public service
broadcasting monopoly and a deep belief in a non - commercial culture. On the
other hand, they also note that the Nordic nations have adopted a typically
positive attitude towards the requirements of technological development and the
constant modernisation of their economies. Sweden presented a "successful
model of Social Democratic brokerage between the demands of social and
cultural policy, and those of economic policy, in a (sic) open - economy
framework" (Dyson, et al. 1988, p. 48 - 49). The Nordic nations are small players
and highly distinctive in the world market and share political, cultural, historical
13

and economic traditions and values going back hundreds of years. As a result,
they naturally turned to each other.
In the early 1970s the Nordic Ministers of Education and Culture, (as part of the
political body of the Nordic Council of Ministers), initiated a commission to
investigate and stimulate the possibility of co - operation betw een the Nordic
nations, in establishing their own satellite broadcasting program (Weibull and
Severinsson 1988, p. 79). Two distinct eras can be constructed: First the
NORDSAT project referred to, (by Weibull, et al. 1988, p. 80), as the 'Cultural
Era' and the second one, TELE- X , referred to as the 'Industrial Era'.
The NORDSAT project was initiated to serve as a defensive wall against the
perceived 'negative' influences of the European continental satellite systems
(Weibull and Severinsson 1988, p. 80). NORDSAT primarily arose out of cultural
concerns. TELE - X, on the other hand, was mainly founded on the objectives of
industrial development. By the beginning of the 1970s (when the NORDSAT
project was under development), the cultural aspects of possible satellite and
cable systems generated great political debate in the Nordic region. This debate
was dominated by tw o controversial topics: advertising and freedom of speech
(Weibull, et al. 1988, p. 88). The commission set up by the Nordic Ministers of
Education and Culture was to investigate the political, judicial, technical, f inancial
and cultural aspects of a Nordic satellite system and, in 1979, they presented five
main guidelines (Weibull, et al. 1988, p. 79 - 80) for a full scale Nordic satellite
broadcasting exchange program:
• A desire to support increasing cultural co - operation between the Nordic
nations.
14

•

The perceived necessity of a Nordic Broadcasting Cooperation in case (or
when) non - Nordic European satellite and cable transmission became a
common part of daily l�e.

•

An increased freedom to choose between channels and programs within the
Nordic nations.

•

A desire to contribute to an increased knowledge of the Nordic languages.

•

An improvement in the cultural and linguistic situation of minority groups (this
mainly referred to the Finnish - Swedes in Sweden and Finland), in Nordic
nations.

The report received a mixed response, and generated great political discussion
between the left and right in Swedish politics. The Swedish Confederation of
Trade Unions (LO) and the public service radio and television broadcasters were
the most critical towards the project. The opposition to NORDSAT was mainly
based on cultural issues, regarding the threat to national cultures (Weibull, et al.
1 988, p. 80). The Metal Workers' Union (the largest in Sweden) praised the
project, because of its importance as a spur to technological development. The
project was, however, rejected in 1981 by all the nations except Norway (Hulten
1 995, p. 5 3).

Upon the rejection of NORDSAT, another project (TELE - X, also involving a
satellite), which had been on the drawing board since the 1960s, gained
ascendancy (Weibull, et al. 1988, p. 82). The State - owned Telia (at the time
called Televerket - the equivalent of Australia's Telstra) was responsible for the
development of TELE - X, in co - operation with the Swedish Space Corporation
(Weibull, et al. 1 988, p. 82). Ekecrantz (Weibull, et al. 1 988, p. 82) notes that
while the N ORDSAT project caused strong political debate and controversy,
15

TELE - X, on the other hand, as a technological project, developed with virtually
no political debate at all, almost finding itself outside the realm of politics.

Analysing the progress of these two projects, satellite broadcasting primarily
started out as Nordic cultural co - operation, but over time it became a highly
important matter of industrial development. The implication is that political
decision - makers found national agreement on technological and industrial
developments, and especially developments in the area of telecommunication
technologies. When discussion arose regarding the practical use of these
technologies, however, intense cultural debate erupted, relating to the fear of
commercial transnational broadcasting over Sweden (Weibull, et al. 1988, p.
100).

Most Swedish political players, mainly in regard to the advances in European
broadcasting, shared the view that technological development was crucial to
Sweden. Technology began (as will be discussed in this dissertation) to be seen
as 'neutral', a component in society that could be used in any way desirable to
achieve the objectives set out. The Swedish socialist government, during the late
1980s and 1990s, was to experience further powerful forces of transnational
broadcasting and deregulation. As a result the culture debate grew stronger and
technology (even though it was responsible for bringing the unwanted influences
to Sweden), became viewed by the socialist government as a tool to use, in order
to protect the Swedish mediasphere and public service broadcasting. TELE - X
was to become a reality in 1989.
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Chapter 2
The Cable and Satellite Age:
Towards a New Mediasphere.

At the beginning of the 1 980s, the Swedish socialist government started to
receive applications from a number of broadcasters (among them the United
Kingdom's Sky Channel), requesting permission to broadcast over Swedish
territory. This, and the emergence of cable and satellite television, was not only
seen as a threat to the state's broadcasting monopoly, but also began generating
concern within the Swedish public service broadcaster, Sveriges Radio (SR which included radio and television until 1 993). The fear centred upon a possible
increase in competition with foreign programs. According to Howell (1 986, p.
1 1 3), "opponents argue that the Scandinavian cultures would be further diluted
due to the quantum increases of Anglo - American programming in English, since
so much already exist[ed] on Nordic TV channels."

Owing to pressure in the late 1 960s and early 1 970s S R, under a conservative
government, had already been through a decentralisation process where the
broadcasting company was divided into four program companies: One for the
three radio channels; one for the two television channels; one for the educational
radio and television and one for local radio (Noam 1 991 , p.204). Once again, the
1 980s promised further upheaval.

17

Technological developments were seen as crucial to Swedish policy - makers.
The fact that the emergence of TELE - X cable and satellite went without any
significant debate, compared to that generated by NORDSAT's cultural issues,
could be argued to be a result of the Promethean 1 promise (further discussed in
chapter 3), which Kurtz (1994) explains is a "symbol for those who wish to use
human achievements, especially technology, to improve the human condition
and are willing to shape nature in order to fulfil our needs and purposes" (p. 1),
and a spur 'to cultivate our own technological skills and values, [and] to use
instrumental intelligence" (p. 4). "M odernity takes as its project the expansion of
technology, reason, and science, for it believes that problems can best be solved
by using such methods wisely" argues Kurtz (1994, p. 5).

The idea of Swedish policy makers seems to have been (and generally still is),
that the more technologically advanced and controlled the Swedish mediasphere
becomes, the easier it will be to resist unwanted influences from abroad. This is
an extremely problematic assumption,

especially given the forces of

globalisation.

Another significant reason for the satellite and cable technological developments
was the increasing flow of transnational information, delivered by new
telecommunication technologies. M cQuail, de M ateo and Tapper (1992, p. 16)
present a model of the forces at work;
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The increasing developments in telecommunication technologies forced the
Swedish government into action. The government's proposal for national
broadcasting 1986 - 1992, "was framed in terms of the need for public service
broadcasting in a media scene characterised by transnational satellite
broadcasting" (Negrine 1988, p. 101). Swedish policy makers were, arguably,
forced to adapt and acquire the new technology, and by applying it in a specific
way, hoped to be able to resist transnational transmissions. The Swedish policy 
makers also hoped that these technological developments would be able to
protect SVT, and its values.
A radio and television in the service of the public [as SVT
claims itself to be] is a societal and cultural institution. We
must not forget that the television industry today has become
the greatest theatre, the most influential provider of news, the
greatest entertainer and the greatest promoter of folkbildning
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in the nation. It has become the national scene and forum for
information and debate (Hulten, S0ndergaard, and Carlsson
2
1996, p. 3).

Morley (1991, p. 5) points out that television watching should not be "understood
as either 'mere ritual' or a process of transmission of ideological (or cultural)
categories, but precisely as operating along both dimensions at once." The rituals
of TV are of vital importance to the understanding of its place in society, and they
therefore play a significant part in the development of ideology (Morley 1 991 , p.
5). SVT was increasingly challenged during the late 1980s and the 1990s by
commercial transnational broadcasters, and the future of SVT and its values and
traditions were closely linked to the future of the concept of public service
broadcasting itself (Hulten, et al. 1996, p. 3). In other words, could SVT remain a
public service broadcaster in the traditional socialist spirit, or did it have to
embrace market ideologies in order to compete with transnational commercial
broadcasting?

In 1982 the conservative government established a parliamentary commission to
investigate cable and satellite television, but the commission was later revised
when the Social Democrats returned to power, and altered to discourage
advertising. The report put forward in 1984 expressed concerns over the cost of
cabling Sweden, as well as funding programs. It recommended that private
funding rather than public money should be used for the development of cable
networks (Noam 1991 , p. 211 ). The commission did not consider the issue
arising from cable and satellite technology to be important to government policy,
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as, for example, was the case in France and Germany. The commission argued
that cabling was more a matter of market demand (Weibull and Severinsson
1 988, p. 87). The socialist government favoured cable networks over direct
satellite broadcasting (although parabolic antennae were not prohibited), and
with the state - owned Telia (equivalent to Australia's Telstra) operating as a
'state' cable network, the state maintained a sense of control over the
technological developments which were affecting the mediasphere.

The cultural issues in relation to the introduction of cable networks, on the other
hand, generated great debate. A governmental report in 1 985 proposed that a
Cable Television Authority should be established to licence and regulate the
cable networks, and cable programming. Each cable system would have a
monopoly in its area, and would be subject to regulation. The cable networks
would:

•

Be issued with three year licences,

•

Be required to distribute the two SVT channels for free,

•

Not mix local and satellite programming on the same channel,

•

Not offer inter - community cable networking,

•

Have no advertising or sponsorship,

•

Operate no discrimination against ethnic groups, and

•

Exercise no exclusive rights to hard news reporting (Howell 1986, p. 113 1 14).
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These policies were developed mainly wtth regard to external pressure from
cable companies, which wanted to establish themselves in the Swedish market.
Even though the government felt that they had not investigated the matter fully,
and were not ready for policy making yet, they felt that they had to regulate if
they were to maintain control of the mediasphere. These regulatory policies
generally expressed the government's desire to protect the public service
broadcaster (Weibull, and Severinsson 1988, p. 1 01). The report led to legislation
in 1986.

The state - controlled mediasphere came to a definite end on New Year's Eve
1987 when the Scandinavian commercial satellite channel, TV 3, began
transmitting from the United Kingdom. Its signals were jammed until 1992,
however, and not available to all cttizens in Sweden. Foreign commercial cable
and satellite channels had also been forbidden to direct advertising towards the
Swedish market. However, the opportunity to transmit from abroad to Sweden
now made the legislation passed in 1986 obsolete. The possibiltty of control and
oversight of Swedish programming by the Cable Television Authority had
diminished.

Since 1995 the Consumer Ombudsman (Konsumentombudsmannen) has tried to
regulate commercials, especially those aimed at children (on TV 3, and TV 5,
3

which began broadcasting in 1989)

,

but both the Court of the European Union

and the Trade Court (Marknadsdomstolen) in Sweden have reached the same
conclusion: Swedish law can only be applied to channels broadcasting from
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within the nation, and foreign channels have to follow legislation in the nations
applicable to them (Tidningarnas Telegrambyra 1998, Nov. 20). By 1990 the
government realised that it was impossible to prevent commercial television
entering Sweden, and discussions that had already lasted for thirty years were
now not based upon whether to introduce commercial television, but upon how to
go about it, and what trade - offs might be possible.

When TV 3 made its appearance in the market in 1987, issues regarding
regulation and advertising arose once again. As well, the future role of the public
service broadcaster became a problematic issue. In 1 989 the government
appointed a commission with responsibility to investigate and put forward a new
basis for the politics of future television broadcasting. Part of the brief for the
commission was to look at the possibility of using commercial television as a
financial resource for new terrestrial networks, to investigate who should be
responsible for these new broadcasts and at what level the state should regulate
such transmissions (Thuren 1997, p. 308). Sverker Gustavsson was appointed
Commissioner.

According to Gustavsson, demands could be placed on commercial channels,
but it would not be possible to expect commercial television channels to serve
minority interests or to carry out the obligations of folkbildning (Thuren 1997, p.
31 2). In Gustavsson's view, however, the obligations of SVT should not be
affected by the presence of transnational broadcasters. SVT should maintain its
responsibilities to observe 'objectivity', to be factual and to allow different
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opinions to be presented on equal terms. Two values were especially
emphasised by the Commissioner; to provide 'good' television and to safeguard
Swedish culture;
The more active we want to be internationally, the more we
have to seek our own identity and knowledge about ourselves,
our own language and our own culture. It is therefore
especially relevant that improved possibilities of information,
entertainment and cultural stimuli reach and are available to
4
everybody in Sweden. (Ttiuren 1997, p. 309)
The question of screening commercials on SVT, became a heavily debated issue
with the Social Democrats against and the Conservatives, Ooined by the
Federation of Swedish Industries), in favour (Noam 1991, p. 207). Newspapers
and magazines had joined in an alliance against the introduction of commercial
television, sparked by their fear of competition for the advertising market. The
emergence of TV 3 however also generated fears within the advertising market
of revenues flowing abroad (Hadenius 1992, p. 125), and increasingly opinion
began to favour commercial television within Sweden in one form or another.

In 1990, via the TELE - X satellite, TV 4 Nordisk Television (later referred to
simply as TV 4) began broadcasting. TV 4 thus became the first commercial
channel to originate from within Sweden and have the legislative right to do so. It
was privately owned by companies within the Wallenberg Group, the book
company

Natur och Kultur (Nature

and

Culture) and

Jordbrukamas

Fore ningsbank (The United Bank of Farmers) (Hadenius and Weibull 1997, p.
183). One of the channel's foundational objectives was the right to be established
as the third terrestrial channel, one on which advertising would be allowed
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(Hadenius 1992, p. 115). This raised another problematic issue, (explored further
in the next chapter), of the diminishing political control by government over the
Swedish political economy, as global capitalism gained a stronger hold and
pushed for transnational deregulation.

It was obvious that the demand for terrestrial commercial television was not
about to go away, and this 'evil' influence, if necessary, should be regulated and
licensed under supervision. Three alternative representations of terrestrial
commercial television were put forward;

•

To allow advertising on one or both of the public service channels,

•

To establish a third private channel, licensed by the government, on which
advertising would be allowed (TV 4's choice), or

•

To allow advertising on both private and public service channels (Hulten
1995, p. 55).

The Minister of Culture, Bengt Goransson (Social Democrat) was opposed to
commercial television. In March 1991, however, the parliamentary parties
reached an agreement that a third channel, privately owned and funded by
advertising, would be delivered terrestrially. Given that this new channel would
have a monopoly on advertising, the public service channels would remain
commercial - free. Crttics maintained that even though SVT stayed commercial free, the "two public [service broadcasting] channels [would] have insufficient
funds, since the politicians [were] unwilling to increase the license fee level. They
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also believe[d] that the battle for viewers [would] become just as 'commercial',
even if the public company [did] not sell advertising" (Hadenius 1992, p. 126).

After debate, and a shift in government from a socialist to a conservative one, it
was decided that TV 4 should be awarded the license to be the third terrestrial
channel, and not TV 3 (the UK - based channel) as had first been suggested. In
1992, TV 4 went terrestrial and by 1994, 98% of the population had access to the
channel (Hadenius and Weibull 1997, p. 183). In return for its advertising
monopoly (and the granting of its four -year - license 1992 - 1996), however, TV
4 had to agree to certain regulations (from Hadenius 1992, p. 126):

•

The ownership of the channel had to be broadly based in Swedish society.

•

A percentage of the advertising revenues had to be paid to the state.

•

The holders of the broadcast licence had to pay the expenses of the

5

distribution of the channel.
•

Certain types of advertising would not be allowed: political, wine and liquor
and advertisements aimed at children.

•

Advertising had to be limited to time blocks,

6

and should not interrupt

programs.
•

The programming had to meet certain public service requirements.

TV 4 was also obliged, for the licence period 1992 - 1996, to broadcast at least
50 hours per week, transmit news on a daily basis (which during the winter
season could not be below ten hours a week), and also broadcast programs
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aimed at children under twelve years. A further condition was that TV 4 should,
over a twelve month period, broadcast at least 40 hours of Swedish or Nordic
television drama and show a minimum 1 5 hours of Swedish - produced material
per week (Hadenius and Weibull 1 997, p. 232).

"TV 4 was, within the framework of commercial conditions which the company
had to follow, to offer a multifaceted range of programs which could be
recognised as high quality"7 (Hadenius and Weibull 1 997, 2 1 9). TV 4 can
therefore principally be regarded as a semi - public service broadcaster regulated
by the state. Hulten (1 996, p. 1 7) notes that the Nordic nations are especially
characterised by regulating commercial channels that have established
themselves alongside the public service broadcaster. Richstad (1 998), an analyst
of Asian mediascapes, has suggested that the introduction of commercial
television on regulatory grounds is an 'Asian - type' of commercialisation. This
seems a similar process to that of Swedish policy makers. Governments "still
maintain tight control over media by administrative, political and economic means
and . . . the process can be characterized as commercialization without
independence" (Richstad 1 998, p. 294). Making sure that these semi - public
service channels in the end live up to their commitments can prove to be a lot
more difficult than drawing up the terms and conditions, however.

Granskningsnamnden is responsible for enforcing the guidelines set out for
Swedish broadcasters, and also for receiving any complaints from citizens.
During the era of the public service monopoly, there was mutual respect between
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SVT and Granskningsnamnden. SVT regarded it as a point of honour that they
should not to be convicted for breaking regulations. When a dispute between
SVT and Granskningsnamnden occurred, however, it provoked heavy debate in
the media (Edin 1996, p. 201). Today there is no self - evident loyalty between

Granskningsnamnden and TV 4. TV 4 has (in certain aspects) failed to meet the
guidelines agreed to, or manipulated and tried to stretch the boundaries of what
the agreement allows, by dividing a program into two parts and inserting, for
example, a news update, with commercials before and after the insert. Such
practices have proven hard to police. For example, Granskningsnamnden could
not dictate the lay - out of 'a program', since that would be in conflict with the
prohibition of censorship (Edin 1996, p. 202). TV 4's breaches of the agreement
were conducted in a way that the traditional public broadcaster could not have
done, or had no reason to do (Edin 1996, p. 201 - 202).

TV 4 relies on the Swedish government for its broadcasting licence, but is not
tied to the same economic dependence upon the state as SVT, which would risk
cuts in its financing n It did not follow the agreed guidelines (Edin 1996, p. 202).
Although SVT is supposed to be 'independent' of the state, since the state
controls its financing it becomes problematic as to how much 'independence'
SVT really has.

When the second SVT channel started in 1969, it represented young and radical
influences, and the channel became known as 'the red channel' (Thuren 1997, p.
217). The channel covered topics like the Vietnam War, conditions in the Third
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World, and (most controversially) conditions in Sweden. The number of appeals
to Granskningsna.mnden increased three fold and the number of programs that
were found 'guilty', owing to a lack of 'objectivtty', also increased dramatically
(Thuren 1997, p. 218). The state initiated an investigation and SVT experienced
cuts in its funding in both 1 970 and 1 974 (Thuren 1997, p. 217 - 218).

The competition between SVT 1 and 2 that began with SVT 2's start in 1969,
ceased in 1996, when the Swedish government decided that the two channels
were to join, and start co - operating with each other. This move came mostly as
a response to the increasing competition for viewers. The public service
broadcaster also received an 11% cut in its budget (Hulten 1996, p. 14).

"It can", according to Thuren (1997, p. 2 1 8), "be argued as to whether or not
these financial cuts [in 1970 and 1 974] were only based on economic grounds, or
if they were also connected with a general dissatisfaction with the too radical
8

nature of programs." Thuren (1997, p. 2 1 8} acknowledges that it would be
difficult to prove the point one way or another, but suggests that it shows quite
clearly that the state (by economic control over SVT), can use its power to force
SVT in a desired direction. The financial cuts in 1996 were (arguably) motivated
to steer the two channels closer to each other, keeping in mind that SVT's costs
are higher, compared to commercial channels. SVT 1 and 2 have to be
financially sound, however, to remain the central broadcasting influence in
Sweden.
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Issues of freedom of speech, financing and the responsibillty of upholding
cultural values have dominated discussions that have preceded changes within
the Swedish mediasphere. The groups that have promoted the abolition of a
broadcasting monopoly have emphasised the importance of freedom of speech
and less government control. They have argued that the market should dictate
broadcasting developments, and not political decision - makers. The official
political response has been that only a larger radio and television company (such
as SVT) has the opportunity to resist commercial influences and ensure freedom
of speech and 'objectivity'. Continuing supporters of a public broadcasting
monopoly have argued that a move towards a market - driven society would
decrease the quality and diversity of programming, and therefore weaken
national culture in Sweden (Hadenius and Weibull 1997, p. 210 - 211).

During the monopoly era of public broadcasting, state interference within SR and
SVT was highly controversial and problematic, and a 'balanced' relationship had
to be maintained. When the monopoly was broken, that 'balance', was no longer
such an important issue, and the accepted view of the role the state should play
regarding the public service broadcaster changed. If the public service
broadcaster we re to transform and become a state television station, the public
would still have access to other channels (Edin 1996, p. 198). As a former public
service broadcasting monopoly, however, now placed in a transnational
environment, SVT's relationship with the public, and Its own role, becomes an
issue.
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The public service broadcaster's relationship with 'the public' has been a
disconnected one. "It has not been regarded appropriate to let the audience have
direct influence over the program policy, owing to the view that it is not
9

sufficiently qualified" (Edin 1996, p. 196). In the current environment, SVT is
forced to compete with commercial channels for the audience. In such a climate,
will SVT be forced to move closer to a market - driven position, or can It uphold
its public service obligations, and Its responsibility to serve the public interest,
minority interest, (even during prime time), and maintain a wide range of
entertainment, news, information and cultural events for everybody (Sepstrup
1993, p. 104)? SVT finds it harder than TV 4 to produce 'popular' programming
schedules and fulfil public service obligations. Since the SVT 1 and 2 have not
primarily relied on serving the interests of the audience, but of the general public,
their role becomes even more problematic. Edin (1996, p. 196) raises the
question as to whether the public service broadcaster, positioned in a market driven environment, will be able to represent anything else than Itself? According
to the views that are most critical of the public service model, the development of
broadcasting in democratic and modern societies has raised problems regarding
the claims of public service broadcasting to represent the general public. It is
argued that these claims serve only as a defence of a representation of a societal
and public unity that does not exist any more (Edin 1996, p. 196 - 197), if It ever
did.

The modus operandi of introducing a new channel into the terrestrial network
(1992), and of merging SVT 1 and 2 (1996), seems to have been a successful
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strategy in keeping the viewers 'within the nation'. The terrestrial channels, (SVT
1 and 2 and TV 4), have 80% of the audience (70% in homes with cable
television), and TV 3 and TV 5 10%, with the remaining per cent of viewing
audience tuning in to other cable channels (Hulten 1995, p. 57).

Over the years a growing fear of transnational broadcasters has gained
momentum and replaced the pro - protectionist fear of tampering with the public
service broadcasting model (Hulten 1996, p. 17). In reluctantly accepting
commercial television, the socialist government has permitted Its existence, but
only on the government's own terms. As will be further analysed in chapter 3,
technology has become an even more important component (as far as the
Swedish government is concerned), of the regulation process in a dynamic
mediasphere. Technological development, values of folkbildning, government
supervision over the mediasphere and protection of Swedish culture have all
dominated aspects of government policy; the challenge has been to balance
these and respond to changes in the broadcasting environment.
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Chapter 3
The G lobal and the Local.
With the development of national television systems around the world in the
1960s, increasing criticism of 'cultural imperialism' gained momentum among
nations, especially with regard to the United States, seen as the major centre
from which national cultures were influenced (Sinclair 1992, p. 99). The Swedish
socialist government, as noted before, has a strong belief in an 'independent',
non - commercial public service monopoly regulated by the State. SVT 1 and 2,
the socialists argue, should be educational and informative tools, builders of
'high culture' and should engage the citizens in political, social and cultural
issues. After the 1960s (when the transnational broadcasters began penetrating
the Swedish mediasphere), the socialist government made it quite clear that
public service media ought to be free of "other imagined interests, where one
1

primarily [referred] to the aspiration of economic profit" (Thuren 1997, p. 132).
Arguably it can be said that commercial culture is 'foreign' culture, and that it is
imperative to the socialist government that the Swedish political, economical and
cultural sovereignty be protected from these perceived negative influences.

After the 'pirate' radio channel Radio Nord was banned in 1962, the socialist
government initiated different projects (NORDSAT, TELE - X) to counteract these
foreign, commercial influences. This presents two problematic issues, which will
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be discussed in this chapter. Firstly, there seems to be a belief that Swedish
culture is something 'pure and authentic' that needs to be protected, and
secondly, that the technology, which is meant to protect that 'pure and authentic'
culture, is regarded as a 'neutral' component in society. This technological
viewpoint is referred to by Vig (1988, in Palmer 1994, p. 80) as the instrumental,
where technology is seen purely as a tool for resolving problems. With the
introduction of digital television in Sweden, technology has been attributed with
another character by the policy makers (which I will return to later), of possibly
being able to fulfil the communication objectives of the socialist government and
bring 'salvation' to the threatened national and cultural sovereignty. This
viewpoint includes an element of technological determinism where the answers
to problems are seen as depending upon the availability of appropriate
technology, rather than the human will which underpins the technology.

According to Vig (1988, in Palmer 1994, p. 80) the technological determinist,
"generally share[s the] assumption that technology is autonomous, and ... tts own
driving force''. Any corporation, Bryan (1994, p. 148) argues, which has the most
advanced technology has the upper hand over other corporations and will be
able to produce cheaper products. In the case of telecommunication corporations
they will also be able to transmtt that product (the information) faster and better,
and as a result, be more profitable. Both the capitalist and the socialist ideologies
discussed here show evidence of a belief in a communicative technological

Promethean promise.
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During the last twenty years the development of the telecommunications industry
has made it increasingly feasible to establish a variety of transnational
communication channels. For the corporations that possess the technology,
owing to the fact that they rely on building their markets and increasing profits, it
is a logical move to establish themselves in new markets and become
transnational (Bryan 1994, p. 147).

Differences in the development of national broadcasting systems reflect
distinguishing characteristics in the political and regulatory approach of the
national government concerned. The Untted States, as a market - led - society,
adopted a commercially - based broadcasting system, with a free flow of
information, provided for a profit. Other nations, like Sweden (socialist) and the
former Soviet Union with Eastern Europe (communist), operated according to the
principles of state - led - societies. These nations established for different
reasons guidelines to either limit the free flow of information and/or to limit the
market freedom of the broadcasters (Richeri 1992, p. 72 - 73). In a world
characterised by an increasing rate and force of political, economical and cultural
globalisation it has become, as discussed in earlier chapters, increasingly difficult
for individual nations to regulate satellite transmission over their territories. These
forces are also characterised by

the disaggregation of the nation - state as the basic economic,
political and socio - cultural unit of world order, and the
ascendance of the private corporation, with tts power base in
globalized industrialization, trade and communication . . . it is
clear that the nation - state's incapacity to control the
electronic movement of information across its borders now
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undermines its powers as a sovereign territorial unit, and as a
consequence, its claims as guardian of 'national cultural
identity', a crucial issue in the cultural imperialism debate
(Sinclair 1992, p. 101).
These issues are live issues with regards to Swedish national broadcasting and
the inclusions of other broadcasters carrying foreign programming; many of them
European, but carrying American content.

Richards and French (1996, p. 33) refer to Golding (1994) in presenting four
main features of a global culture:
First, is the supposed decline of the nation as a cultural force:
people are asserted to identify more with supra - national
cultural affiliations, than with those of the nation. Allied to this
is the end of the nation - state as a political and economic
force. Second , new levels of organisations, both 'above', at the
supra - national level, and 'below', at the regional level,
supposedly take over the functions previously performed by
national governments. Third, is what Golding refers to as the
'syndicalisation of experience' - the emergence of major
cultural and commercial symbols, in the form, most obviously,
of internationally traded branded goods. Finally, he points to
the role of the major international languages, particularly
English, as vehicles for international culture.
Both telecommunication economist Jussawalla (1996, in Richstad 1998, p. 28 9)
and the Hon. Justice Kirby (1998, p 6 3) partly attribute the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the subsequent break up of the Eastern European nations' political systems, and
the consequent collapse of the Soviet Union to the influence of the
telecommunication industry, which would indeed be technological determinism.
The Eastern Bloc was unable to prevent transnational broadcasts by Western
media from entering its territory, with communist East Germany receiving
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significant amounts of ideological information from its neighbour West Germany,
through television and radio broadcasts, influenced by the Untted States. The
former American Germany - based Radio Free America also beamed its signal
into the East Bloc, promoting western values. Arguably, those transmissions
would have had an enormous impact on the cultures of the East European
nations, especially since former East and West Germany share the same
language. On the other hand Radio Moscow had no such influence on the West!
There is more going on here than technological determinism. Morley (1996, in
Waisbord 1998, p. 381) argues that "the 'magic carpet' of broadcasting
technologies plays a fundamental role in promoting national unity at a symbolic
level, linking individuals and their families to the 'centre' of national life, offering
the audience an image of the nation as a knowable community" . Western media
could thus potentially redefine 'national life' winning Eastern European hearts
and minds to the political system of capttalism and a free - market ideology.

The telecommunication sector is primarily responsible for influencing the 'nervous
system' of modern society and exchanges of information and knowledge are of
extreme importance in world economic activities and the balance of power
(Commission of the European Communities 1 988, in Mowlana 1994, p. 163).
Robert W. McChesney (1998, p. 2) lists two ways in which the communication
industry is involved in globalisation processes:

First, due in part to stunning developments such as digital and
satellite communication technologies, communication and
information are coming to play a larger and more important
role in capitalist economies. . . . Some even go so far as to
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argue that 'information' has replaced manufacturing as the
foundation of the economy. Second, the commercial media,
advertising, and telecommunication markets themselves are
rapidly globalizing, arguably even more so than the balance of
political economy. Indeed, global media and communication
[industries] are [not at all neutral, but] in some respect the
advancing armies of global capitalism.
Deregulation of national broadcasting systems thus becomes an objective for the
Untted States' industry, in order to gain access to different national markets.
Competition within international markets is also driven by the US attempt to
export a commercially - driven broadcasting model, which weakens the
individual national broadcasting industry (Mowlana 1994, p. 163).

According to Tusa (1 995, p. 52) "there is strong evidence that a country cannot
modernise and turn from a controlled economic system to an open one unless it
enjoys access to open information". This raises the question as to whether a
controlled economic system necessarily becomes an open one upon access to
open information. It also includes the implication that 'modern' is synonymous
with 'an open communication system'. Nonetheless, the telecommunication
industry is seen as a crucial part of socio - economic development (Chan 1991 ,
p. 183), and culture depends, for its very existence, on different modes of
communication (Powell 1985, p. 178).

Given that it possesses the most developed commercial media culture
(McChesney 1998, p. 17), the United States has acquired a special position on
the international scene. This preeminence is a result of the large amount of US exported programs, (and consequently export of American culture), the lack of
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imports of foreign programs and the broadly commercially - based broadcasting
system, which operates as part of an unregulated and competitive market
(Powell 1985, p. 193).

The United States does regulate its own telecommunication industry, and pushes
for communtty obligations, but not to the same extent as some other nations. In a
governmental investigation, The Telecom 2000 Report, the United States'
government established a regulatory point of view on the free market control of
broadcasting system:

Television remains the most regulated of electronic mass
media. Policymakers must develop a regulatory framework
which both recognizes new and evolving marketplace realtties
and affords broadcasters a full and fair opportunity to compete
effectively in an increasingly competttive and dynamic media
environment. Where competition can be reasonably expected
to function as an effective surrogate for what regulation ideally
might accomplish, government should not regulate and
reliance should be placed on the marketplace. (Doyle 1992, p.
153)
A 1994 SVT agreement (Hulten 1995, p. 52) states that "public broadcasting
'shall' offer a diversity of opinion and cater to differing interests, which 'implies an
obligation' to 'scrutinize authorities, organizations and private firms which exert
influence over policy affecting the public' and 'shall stimulate public discussion of
important socio - economic and cultural issues"'. SVT shall also, as proposed by
the government in the media plan for 1 997 - 2001 , be radio and television
broadcasters in the service of the public, and the content shall display a high
degree of variety, depth, quality and as a whole promote values of folkbildning
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(Knutsson 1 997, p. 62). These objectives, according to socialist policy, would not
be possible under a commercial media system. Nonetheless, technology,
commercialism and market pressure all have a tendency to make radio,
television and the print media increasingly uniform and global, in both their form
and their content, and regardless of where they originated or their social and
cultural situation (Morgan 1 997, p. 3). Free - market communications have
become a tool to penetrate nations that have polttical inclinations towards
regulated markets, after which the dominant core can expand its own market
interests into the colonised cultures and markets. As well as Sweden, another
example is China, with approximately 1 .2 billion people. This becomes an
extremely attractive market for transnational corporations. China has raised
concern regarding Murdoch's H ong Kong - based STA R TV and tts rapid
penetration into Asia, reaching 36 nations from Egypt in the west to Japan in the
east, Indonesia in the south to Siberia in the north (Chan 1 994, p. 1 1 4), and
exerting a western influence.

Both the United States, as a super power, and Sweden, as a smaller nation, seek
economic profit and technological and social development. The conflicting
approaches in broadcasting technologies, and the conflicting policies regulating
them, have nonetheless created a great conflict of interest. As Shoesmith (1 993,
p. 271 ) argues, there are immense value differences at work between the
commercial and the cultural, the national and the global. The United States has
become a 'core' of 'culture imperialism' influencing the rest of the world, 'the
periphery'. As communication systems are rapidly becoming global in scale
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(influenced by the US' model, and carrying US programs, advertising global
brands), nations see their political boundaries disappear as goods, services and
information flow increasingly unhindered across national borders. The use of
media by the core to offer a hegemonic representation of culture has become
regarded as equal to 'cultural imperialism' (Richards and French 1996, p. 29).
'Cultural imperialism', as argued by Green (1 994, p. 171), "serves the economic
and industrial ends of transnational corporate power by fostering an environment
which promotes consumerism. Media products, portrayed lifestyles and marketed
goods are all consumed by the colonised culture". Contradicting this claim to be a
'colonised' culture, however, and balancing the perceived threat to polltical and
cultural sovereignty, is the fact that there does exist a local demand for the
dominant core products. These local demands cannot be ignored, and national
and transnational companies cannot make people want and buy things that they
in the end do not really want (Bryan 1 994, p. 156), or watch television programs
that they do not really like.

Visualising the core - periphery dynamic of globalisation from another
perspective, one can regard Sweden as the 'core', whose task it is to limlt the
free flow of broadcasting from the rest of the world, 'the periphery'. Comparing
these two scenarios, (Sweden as core, and the US as core) the advantage
enjoyed by the dominant forces of globalisation, and the power of resistance by
the less dominating nations, can be observed. While the dominant core
concentrates on the expansion of its markets, however, and on promoting its
capitalist ideology, other nations express concern that not only do they have to
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develop economically and compete with the dominant markets, but they also
regard it necessary to protect their cultural values, beliefs, traditions and
languages against the dominant norm, which they are concerned may dilute and
destroy their national identities. Therefore, communication technology becomes
the forum from where these influences can be resisted and controlled, and where
these ideological battles are waged.

Ferguson (Shoesmith 1993, p. 270) has also approached the subject of
globalisation and in her description of it argues that the principal elements are:

•

'Big is better'

•

'More is better'

•

'Time and space have disappeared'

•

'Global cultural hegemony'

•

'Saving planet Earth', and

•

'Democracy for sale via American television'.

These elements are argued to have arisen from two dominant cultural
perceptions that have created and formed the popular conception of technology.
Firstly, there is the "Promethean promise that technology, applied judiciously, can
resolve the fundamental problems besetting humankind" and secondly, that of
plenitude; "that through technology we can construct the ideal society in which
want has been dismissed" (Shoesmith 1993, p.270). The media are highly
involved in the second viewpoint, mainly through advertising, where the capitalist
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ideals of possession and consumption are constructed and promoted (Shoesmith
1993, p. 270). A society where the state lets market forces construct as many
social relations and exchanges as is feasible by interfering as little as possible in
the lives of the citizens (Hall, in During 1993, p. 1 9), is considered to be the most
successful one by the dominant core.

Again visualising Sweden as the core and the rest of the world as the periphery,
from which the Swedish culture has to be protected, one can also observe a
Promethean promise concerning communication technologies; this time from a
socialist point of view.

One of the deepest held beliefs in Sweden is that broadcasting should not be
commercialised, but when transnational commercial - financed channels began
beaming their prog rams into Sweden, and attracting audiences, fears were
raised of revenues flowing abroad.

"Given that the pressure towards

internationalisation is very much driven by the dynamics of commercial
competition and the increasing dominance of the free market..." (Richards and
French 1 996, p. 37 -38), it became clear that the technological advancements
taking place could not be prevented, and the only productive alternative was to
take advantage of them. As the broadcasting monopoly was threatened the
socialist government analysed available communication technologies, and
developed and applied them in a preferred way. The aim was to protect SVT and
the Swedish mediasphere, and also to satisfy the market and public needs,
brought to the surface by transnational corporations and media companies
43

beaming their signals into Sweden. As a result of the European - based satellite
commercial channel TV 3 transmitting over Swedish territory and bypassing
Swedish law, the socialist government established a national regulated, free - to
- air commercial television channel, TV 4. If commercialism was a necessary
evil, it was to be under government supervision and control. By establishing a
Swedish version of the imposing cross - border broadcasting channels, Swedish
audiences were able to be maintained within the nation's political and cultural
borders, since it soon proved the case that Swedes prefer the domestic version
of commercialism to that beamed in from outside.

As the different national political, economical and cultural spheres become
increasingly globalised, it has been argued that the national increasingly resists
globalisation by transforming it locally. Meyrowitz' (1 985, in Morley 1 991 , p. 7 - 8)
main argument is that the transnational media are redefining the conceptions of
'position' and 'place', separating experience from physical locality, making places
more and more uniform and, as a result, the importance of locality is declining.
The new media today, Meyrowitz (1 989, in Morley 1 991 , p. 8) continues,

is certainly likely to 'relativize' our sense of place - so that
'locality is no longer necessarily seen as the centre stage of
life's drama'. That centre stage is then ... taken by national
television in the home, bringing us news of the 'generalized
elsewhere' of other places and 'non - local' people and their
sim ultaneous experiences - thus undermining any sense of
the primacy of 'locality' as the 'unifying rhetorical space of daily
television extends into the living rooms of everyone'.
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Thus instead of the local being local - within - a - nation, interpreting the global
from various so urces, the nation becomes the 'local', receives the global, and
broadcasts a 'common cultural understanding' of the global product, to citizens
within the nation. Localtty appears not only to be included in the national and
global, but as Meyrowitz (1989, in Morley 1991, p. 8) argues, also "increasingly
bypassed in both directions: experience is both unified beyond localtties and
fragmented between them". The issues of nation, narration and the relationship
between them become increasingly important, along with language and
discou rse.

Through

these devices

communication

technologies

(mainly

television) create specific national narratives of culture and identity, in order to
connect national and international spheres, while maintaining the image and
reality of the 'national family' and the international community beyond (Morley
1991, p. 12).

"The c ritical issue is that control over communication technology means control
over information, and control over information is a precondttion of political power"
(Bryan 1994, p. 155). In a world where info rmation tends to flow increasingly
freely between nations, national polttical 'power' is rapidly diminishing.
Technological developments in Sweden became a channel thro ugh which much
of these perceived negative influences arrived. Swedish developments have
themselves played a part in the processes of globalisation, and the free flow of
information, while at the same time trying to prevent or control these forces.
Nonetheless, in 1997, the Swedish socialist government decided that a terrestrial
digital network should be established. The government recommended (Sveriges
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Riksdag

1997)

in

a

parliamentary

proposition

(1 996/97:67,

bet.

and

1 996/97:KU17) that terrestrial digital television should be introduced by several
steps, allowing the State to observe its progress, and from there decide future
developments of the project. Lars Jeding, appointed to investigate the
possibilities of digital television, suggested that the new technology be introduced
as quickly as possible by terrestrial means, owing to the fact that it is in the
terrestrial realm that the real influence of the State lies, by out - manoeuvring
both the cable and satellite industries (Andersson 1 996). Within a terrestrial
network, the government would have licensing control over the channels
permitted to broadcast and consequently, of the programming offered to its
citizens (Crofts 1998). This would especially be the case after the analogue
system was closed down (not later than 2007), when the only alternative to cable
and satellite would be the digital network (Andersson 1996). The digital terrestrial
net will most likely consist of SVT's channels, commercial channels and pay television services (Andersson 1 996), but service providers would have to agree
to specific regulations and obligations drawn up by the government in order to
secure a broadcasting licence. The government here is visualising that through
digital technology, it will be able to establish and enjoy the control over national
and transnational media it once had during the monopoly days, thereby
protecting Swedish culture from the perceived negative influences of
globalisation. In a regulatory climate, would commercial television be able to
survive financially, or would it have to seek other markets? Could and would the
Swedish socialist government over - regulate such a television station, making
Sweden an unprofitable market?
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It is evident that 'culture' , which the Swedish policy - makers want to protect, is
not something pure, authentic or never - changing, on the contrary as Miller
(Morley 1 991, p. 9 - 1 0) argues, "the 'local' is not to be considered as an
indigenous source of cultural identity, which remains 'authentic' only in so far as it
is unsullied by contact with the global. Rather, the 'local' is itself often produced
by means of the indigenization of global resources and inputs". An alternative
situation, offered by Shoesmith (1993, p. 2 71 ), is the production of a hybridised
culture. Shoesmith theorises that a culture, exposed to other cultures, adopts
certain features and transforms those features through distinctive cultural
practices. C ultures are forever changing, through interactions within and between
nations and peoples, and therefore are always hybridising. The perceived
connection between culture and territory becomes less important, owing to the
fact that cultures are constantly changing as a result of individual choice and
taste, and this leads to the rejection of the charge of cultural imperialism (Golding
1 998, p. 8 3).

Twelve years after the UK - based pirate channel TV 3 broke the monopoly of
SVT in 198 7, Swedish culture has undergone dramatic changes. This is
especially the case regarding broadcast culture (although it is not argued here
that the Swedish culture was something 'pure' before 1 98 7). The question that
must be posed is: Will today's Swedish socialist policy - makers now turn the
clock back to 1 98 7, to the way 'culture' was then (which is impossible), or will
they accept the 'culture' of today and try to 'freeze' it, or will they let culture keep
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on evolving and growing? Culture is not outside time nor can it be easily
manipulated. Instead, culture is forever changing and evolves through the
influence of (individual) people from around of the world. This will happen even if
the government visualises itself as having control of the (still perceived 'neutral')
Swedish national communication media, turning it into a kind of 'regulated
globalism'. One thing is certain, the Swedish government will still exercise its
power over issues regarding television advertising, which it sees as the greatest
threat to national culture. Transnational broadcasting corporations have been
positioned as the 'advancing troops of global capitalism' weakening, as a result,
the control of governments over national political and economical issues. If this is
the case, has the Swedish government, by opting for a digital terrestrial network
over cable and satellite, succeeded in securing its defensive and protective
position, and political and economic sovereignty? The digitalisation of the
terrestrial broadcasting system, and of television receivers, will cost approx. 10 20 billion Swedish Crowns [A$ 2 - 4 billion] (Andersson 1996). This will open up
an enormous new market for Swedish industry, which has the capacity to
produce the transmission and receiving technology, and thus the possible
economic benefits from this policy development will remain locally, fulfilling the
Promethean promise and delivering a semblance of regulatory control.
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Concl usion

Forty years after Radio Nord first began to challenge the government's
broadcasting monopoly in Sweden, dramatic changes can be observed within the
Swedish mediasphere. Sweden's regulatory regime has moved closer towards
those in Western Europe, where commercial broadcasting systems dominate. In
the Nordic nations, however, the public service broadcasting system can still be
regarded as the core model, with the commercial channels as a peripheral
addition (Hulten 1996, p. 9).

Since the start of transnational radio and television broadcasting, the Swedish
socialist government has expressed concern over the perceived threats to the
nation's culture, values and traditions. The government has responded with a
strategy of observation, investigation and technology development (in the spirit of
socialism) to accommodate and regulate changes in telecommunications within
the mediasphere, with the aim of supporting the principles of folkbildning.

Swedish

socialists

regarded

the

developments

in

transnational

telecommunications in Europe and the USA as a threat to their broadcasting
ideology; and they have resisted the introduction of commercially - based
systems, and 'free' transnational broadcasting. The Swedish government's usual
response to foreign developments in technology and broadcasting practice has
been to obse rve the changes and appoint a commission to investigate their
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possible

implications,

and

potential

applications,

within

the

Swedish

mediasphere.

Given that Swedish socialists have held political power for almost all of
broadcasting history, they have had a great influence on the development
broadcasting in Sweden. While the NORDSAT project caused considerable
cultural debate between the Nordic nations (which eventually led to its collapse),
the development of the mainly Swedish funded TELE - X, based on objectives of
technological development, seemed to be outside political debate altogether
(Weibull and Severinsson 1988, p. 82). TELE - X was deemed by all political and
social players to be crucial to Sweden. From the 1950s onwards technology has
increasingly been regarded as a 'neutral' and 'necessary' element in society; an
instrument to be used in achieving socialist objectives.

With the end of the broadcasting monopoly Sweden now receives an increasing
amount of transnational programming. This has forced the socialist government
to keep itself up to date with the latest technologies. These advances are
regarded as helping to protect the Swedish mediasphere from any undesirable
influence, as well as promoting the values of public service broadcasting.
Technology has been seen by policy - makers as an instrument with which to
protect the Swedish mediasphere.

The problematic issue arising here is that technology is not neutral but
represents a strategy by which commercial players in core nations can attempt to
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break down the regulatory barriers of other nations. One effect of this is that
market interests can expand and make peripheral nations increasingly capitalist
in their form and appearance. Over time, as new government regulations have
been introduced, technological developments (and the few corporations
controlling them) have moved to by - pass these. Responding to this challenge
the Swedish socialist government has re - ordered the mediasphere and
implemented new regulations. Ironically, the Swedish attitude which perceives
technological development as crucial, has led to domestic technological
developments (TEL E - X for example) contributing to the satellite systems which
have enabled foreign information to reach Swedish citizens. Consequently
Swedish technology has directly encouraged the forces of globalisation.

During the ongoing debate about Swedish 'culture', political and social concern
has grown stronger. Swedish culture has been regarded as something 'unique•,
and distinct from other cultures. Even among the Nordic nations cultural issues
have created great debate. Despite the efforts of cultural protection, the result
has been that Swedish culture has changed. It has responded to influences from
within the nation as well as from abroad. The process of hybridisation (Shoesmith
1993, p. 271) has transformed and integrated internal and external influences
into a social and cultural understanding and as a result, political and social
values and beliefs have also changed. "Globalisation", Souchou (1994, p. 35)
argues, "breaks up the insularity which has made feasible the opposition
between us and them in the first place." Even so, the socialist government has
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increasingly resisted an unregulated mediasphere and uncontrolled foreign
influences reaching Swedish citizens.

Policy - makers have shown great enthusiasm over the development of digital
television. Still regarding technology as 'neutral', they have laid great faith in a
communicative

Promethean promise,

which

promote

salvation

through

technology and offers glimpses of a national state of broadcasting perfection.
"Control of the international flow of data is a virtual impossibility, and yet at the
same time a precondition of national sovereignty" (Frow 1 992, p. 11). Trust in
future technological developments are the one hope left for nations that wish to
regulate their mediasphere.

"Industrial expansion and rapid technological change continue in ... [Sweden], in
part because of the demands made by other expanding nations. The existing
expansionist phase of technological civilization cannot, however, be expected to
continue indefinitely" (Encyclopredia Brrrannica n.d.b). The Swedish government
has opted to develop a digital terrestrial network. The granting of broadcast
licences will allow regulation of channels, commercial and non - commercial, that
request permission to broadcast wrrhin Sweden. Arguably the Swedish socialist
government visualises digital television as a beneficial development in
broadcasting technology, one which will allow regulation to achieve their
objectives of a controlled national broadcasting sphere, where any future threats
to the socialist ideology will be neutralised. Through regulation the Swedish

52

government seems to hope for a stable mediasphere of public service
broadcasting and the peripheral addition of commercial broadcasting.

The activities of transnational corporations have led to an enormous increase in
the flow of information, people, goods and services, further eroding national
boundaries and pushing forward the processes of globalisation. A deregulated
broadcasting media is positively correlated with the development of capitalism in
a nation.

In Sweden,

commercial broadcasting represents a reluctant

accommodation of foreign pressure to integrate fully within the global economy.
Nonetheless, the Swedish government has never given up its ambition to use
broadcasting regulation to protect the public service broadcaster and promote the
values of folkbildning and of Swedish culture.

Given that national sovereignty is bolstered by the control of information (Frow
1992, p. 11), the socialists have regarded that sovereignty as strengthened by
the progress in technology, and by its application. The socialist government still
regards it important to safeguard Swedish culture against the power of
transnational corporations and the threats of an increasingly globalised world.
Even though the government wants Sweden to be a player in the international
market, they hope that continuing regulation will protect the Swedish economy
and culture, and maintain its integrity as a sovereign state. However, they are
also aware that transnational corporations constantly engage all national states
within the web of global capitalism, and thus the struggle for autonomy will
continue.
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The Swedish government has accepted commercial television as a peripheral
part of its mediasphere. In responding to the internal and external voices of a
less regulated mediasphere, the government introduced (on its own terms and
conditions) an optional version of commercial television, TV 4, hoping to satisfy
both the market and the public. With regard to the public service broadcaster,
SVT has gone through significant changes. In addition to those outlined earlier,
SVT Europa (a mix of SVT 1 and 2) began broadcasting in 1997 over Europe
(Nevis Electronics 1998, p. 1 ). Wtth the introduction of digital television in 1 998 99, another channel, SVT 24 (a twenty - four hour news channel) has been
introduced (Crofts 1998, p. 2). In response to public and market demand, the
Swedish policy - makers have continued to follow the pattern of introducing
Swedish alternatives to the foreign channels broadcasting over Sweden. This
has shown to be a successful response. Swedish citizens still seem to prefer
their own national television services (with an audience share of 70 - 80 percent)
(Hulten 1995, p. 57), through which the values and traditions of Swedish (eltte)
culture, non - commercialism and folkbildning are highly promoted.
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Endnotes
C hapter 1 .
1 ).

The name of the Swedish Parliament.

2 ).

Folkbildning - translated as 'popular adult education' or could be referred to as 'comm on
knowledge'.

3 .
)

O riginal quote: "Nagra som irrelevanta uppfattade sidointressen, varmed man framst
asyftar stravan efter ekonomisk vinst."

4

Landsorganisationen - LO

).

5)
.

Original quote: . . . "att pa manga olika satt halla medborgarna val informerade. Malet ar
har en allsidig information om det egna landet och varlden i stort, vilket verkligen nar fram
till alla de vuxna medborgama, de som bar upp samhallsstyrelsen. Ett vasentligt led i
denna information utger redovisningen av de skilda asikter, varderingar och
meningsriktningar vilka ingar som en integrerad del av den moderna demokratin. Vi
forestaller oss namligen att en val fungerande dem okrati kraver kunniga m edborgare,
vilka tar del av opinionsbildningen i samhallet och darter kan deltaga i statslivet pa ett
meningsfullt satt."

6 .
)

O riginal quote: "Narmare eftertanke visar . . . att den "stora" publiken bestar av en
mangfald sterre och mindre grupper, att varje individ kan tillhera flera av dessa, och att
dessa grupptillhorigheter och intressen korsar varandra och vaxlar pa manga satt. Man
maste ocksa halla i minnet, att olika intressen kan vara mer eller m indre centrala for den
enskilde, att vad samlar en stor publik ofta ar en slags "minsta gemensamma namnare"
som ocksa ar ganska perifer for de fiesta som in gar i denna publik, och att det mycket
ofta ar just de intressen som den enskilde delar m ed ett fatal andra som betyder mest for
honom. Darter ar det lika viktigt att tillgodose de sma publikernas enskemal som att ta
hansyn till de stora publikerna."

7 .
)

O riginal quote: . . . "gentemot den andliga odlingen, mot de skena konsternas utveckling,
mot stil och ton i samhallet, ja i vidare m ening mot alla de manskliga varden som kan
paverkas av dessa mediaverksamheter."

8 .
)

Granskningsnamnden, used to be referred to as Radionamnden, but will throughout the
dissertation be referred to as Granskningsnamnden.

C hapter 2.
1 ).

"Prometheus, 'the forethinker', was the most gifted of the Titans. Athene taught him
architecture, astronomy, mathematics, navigation, m edicine and m etallurgy and other
useful arts, all of which he pass ed on to mankind. W hen Zeus, angry with the race of
men, proposed to extirpate them and withheld the gift of fire from them, Prometheus
defied his ban, stole the fire . . . and gave it to mankind.
In revenge Zeus chained him to a roc k in the Caucasus and sent an eagle to eat h is
liver which g rew again at night as fast as the bird could devour it by day. Despite his
55

sufferings, Prometheus remained defiant, so combining in G reek mythology th e roles of
father of technology, friend of mankind and supreme rebel" (Bullock, 1 971 , p. 1 2).
"A Prom ethean is not concerned simply with h is or her own self - preservation and
prosperity, but with thos e whom h e or she cherishes, and he or she has an altruistic
regard for all humanity. Prometheus is concerned with the com mon good, which he or
she thinks can be ameliorated" (Kurtz, 1 994, p. 5) . "Prometh eus . . . loved man too much
. . . thus the demonic destroyer is a non - Promethean; for he is not concerned with the
common good nor does he love humankind" (Kurtz, 1 994, p. 4).
As Kurtz ( 1 996, p. 1 ) explains, and very close to the philosophy of the Swedish
socialists (and others as well): "Secular hu manism . . . believes in the possibility of
objective knowledge, and it encourages the continued development of science and
technology [of which the com munication technologies are a major part] to solve human
problems." Secular humanism "is committed to democracy, universal humanistic rights,
separation of church and state, and the building of a world community, . . . and it is
optimistic about the human prospect, and it affirms out ability to control future events and
to ameliorate and enhance the human condition" (Kurtz, 1 996, p. 1 ).
2) .

Original quote: "En radio och TV i allmanhetens tjanst ar en samhallelig och kulturell
institution. Vi far inte glomma att televisionen idag har blivit den storsta teatern, den
inflytelserikaste nyhetsform edlaren, den storsta underhallaren, och den storsta
folkbildaren i land et. Den har blivit den nationella scenen och det nationella forumet for
information och debatt."

3

).

Commercial television channels, TV 3 and TV 5, transmit from the United Kingdom and
Luxembou rg respectively.

).

Original quote: "Ju mer aktiva vi viii vara internationellt, desto m er maste vi beflita oss
om var sjalvkannedom, vart eget sprak och var kultur. D et ar darter sarskilt vasentligt att
forbattrade mojligheter till information, underhallning och kulturell stimulans kommer alla i
Sverige till del."

).

Exceeding SEK 750 million (approx. A$ 1 50 million) plus the licence fee, SEK 50 million
(approx. A$ 1 0 million) per year. In 1 995 TV 4 paid the Swedish state S EK 300 million
(approx. A$ 60 million) in accordanc e with the agreement (Hadenius and W eibull, 1 997,
p. 233).

).

Between programs only, and not exceeding ten per c ent of total broadcast time, and not
more than thirteen per c ent per broadcast hour (Hulten, 1 995, p. 56).

).

Original quote: "TV 4 skall inom ramen for de kom mersiella vilkor som foretaget har att
folja, erbjuda ett mangsidigt programutbud som kannetecknas av hog kvalite."

4

5

6

7

8 .
)

Original quote: "Det kan diskuteras om dessa besparingar enbart var ekonomiskt
betingade eller om de ocksa hade samband med missnoje med den i mangas ogon alltfor
radikala programpolitiken".

9 .
)

Original quote: "Det har inte ansetts lampligt att lata publiken ha direkt inflytande over
programpolitiken eftersom den inte bedomts vara tillrackligt kvalificerad."
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C hapter 3.
1)
.

Original quote: "Nagra som irrelevanta uppfattade sidointressen, varmed man framst
asyftar stravan efter ekonomisk vinst."
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